

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM MBFR REPRESENTATIVE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO
SUBJ: MBFR: BRIEFING PAPER FOR GENSCHER VISIT TO THE US

REF: BONN 11219

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH US REPS ON JULY 7, FRG REP (PROTECT ESPECIALLY) MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT THE POLICY PAPER PREPARED BY FRG FON OFF FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER FOR LATTER'S VISIT TO THE USIUKJNAIN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT BY CYFNCELGY SCHMIDT. FRG REP SAID HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TMPHSCRIBE THE FON OFF PAPER AND HAD NOT SEEN FINAL PARSION. MOREOVER, HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER CHA GLOR SCHMIDT, WHO HAD HIS OWN IDEAS ON THE SUBJECT OF JBFR, WOULD DRAW ON THE PAPER IN DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT

OR SECRETARY VANCE, ALTHOUGH GENSCHER MIGHT DO SO.

2. FRG REP SAID THAT THE LAST VERSION OF THE PAPER HE HAD SEEN CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING POINTS AMONG OTHERS.

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3. THE PAPER CONTEMPLATES THAT WESTERN MOVES AFFECTING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON MBFR WOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL THE EAST/WEST DATA DISCUSSION HAD REACHED A MORE DECISIVE PHASE. COMMENT: WE DO NOT AGREE THAT WESTERN MOVES SHOULD BE ADHERED DEPENDING ON PROGRESS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION. WE BELIEVE THAT LIMITED WESTERN MOVES ON THE SUBSTANCE NOW, NATURALLY IN RETURN FOR A SPECIFIED QUID PRO QUO FROM THE EAST, COULD ALSO

HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE WEST'S FORTHCOMING PROPOSAL TO TABLE DISAGGREGATED DATA, A REACTION WHICH WE EXPECT TO BE NEGATIVE, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, ON SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DIVULGE THE EXISTENCE OF A DISPARITY. THIS CONSIDERATION APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN MOVE ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN US. MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF WESTERN DESIRE TO MOVE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD HAVE NO AFFECT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WESTERN REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS BUT ONLY ON THE TIMING OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION. WE THINK SUCH A MOVE SHOULD BE MADE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. END COMMENT

4. SECOND, FRG REP CONFIRMED VAN WELL'S COMMENT IN REFTTEL THAT THE PAPER INCLUDED THE RUTH PROPOSAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THREE PHASES. FRG REP COMMENTED THAT THIS CONCEPT ASSUMED PRIOR EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON THE EXISTENCE AND SIZE OF THE DISPARITY AND THAT ITS VALUE WOULD BE AS A FACE-SAVER FOR THE EAST IN THAT IT WOULD USE THE EASTERN METHOD OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING THE COMMON CEILING GOAL PROPOSED BY THE WEST. THIS PROPOSAL MIGHT ALSO BE MODIFIED TO SPECIFY THE TIMING OF THE THREE PHASES OF REDUCTION. IF SO, IT MIGHT THUS ALSO BE CONSIDERED TO GIVE THE EAST SOME SATISFACTION AS REGARDS ITS DEMANDS FOR GUARANTEES FROM THE WEST ON TIMING OF REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT
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PARTICIPANTS.

5. THIRD, FRG REP INDICATED THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE PAPER CONTAINED TREATMENT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SEPARATE SIGNAL TO THE EAST ON AMOUNT AND TIMING OF WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS.

6. FOURTH, THE FON OFF PAPER ALSO DEALT WITH THE COLLECTIVITY ISSUE. FRG REP POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA HAD MADE CLEAR BILATERALLY THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES IN MOSCOW WERE PREPARED TO DEPART FROM NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BUT WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT PROVIDING BOTH FOR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS FOR EACH SIDE AND FOR SEPARATE SUBCEILINGS ON THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US. THE PAPER SUGGESTS THAT, IN ORDER TO MEET THESE SOVIETS REQUIREMENTS AND TO OBTAIN WARSAW PACT AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THE WEST MIGHT CONSIDER A COMPROMISE VERSION OF THE SUBCEILING ON THE SOVIETS, TO THE EFFECT THAT, IN A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT, THE PHASE I SUBCEILING ON THE SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER WOULD BE CONTINUED AT THE SAME NUMERICAL LEVEL AS IN PHASE I EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO REDUCE FURTHER FORCES IN PHASE II. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD THUS GIVE THE SOVIETS SOME SPECIFIED QUOTE ROOM

AT THE TOP UNQUOTE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF THEIR MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA BACK TO ITS PHASE I LEVEL AT SOME POINT FOLLOWING PHASE II WITHDRAWALS OF SOVIET FORCES.

7. COMMENT: WE CONSIDER THAT TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIETS WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION BECAUSE IT WOULD SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO RETREAT FROM THE WESTERN DEMAND THAT THERE BE A SUBCEILING ON SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND ENCOURAGE FURTHER SOVIET PRESSURE TO MOVE TOWARDS FULL COLLECTIVITY AND THE ELIMINATION OF ANY SUBCEILING ON SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

8. IN OUR VIEW, A SUBCEILING ON SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN
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THE REDUCTION AREA IS A CARDINAL REQUIREMENT OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND THE WEST SHOULD REMAIN FIRM ON THIS MATTER VIS-A-VIS THE EAST. UNDER AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH THERE WAS NO SUBCEILING ON THE SOVIETS, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE THE CAPACITY FOLLOWING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO PREVAIL ON ONE OF THEIR EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES TO REDUCE ITS REAR ECHELON FORCES AND REPLACE THEM WITH CIVILIANS, SO THAT THE SOVIETS COULD MAKE INCREASES IN THEIR FRONT LINE COMBAT FORCES IN THE AREA, THUS BRINGING SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA IN COMBAT UNITS PREHAPS TO ITS PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL OR EVEN HIGHER. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT WOULD IN THIS WAY HAVE INCREASED, THE WES WOULD BE OBLIGED BY THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO REMAIN AT THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL CONTRACTED FOR. THUS, A REDUCED NUMBER OF WESTERN FORCES WOULD BE CONFRONTING A MILITARILY STRENGTHENED WARSAW PACT FORCE WITH IMPROVED CAPABILITIES FOR STANDING START ATTACK. END COMMENT

9. THE SOURCE SHOULD BE SPECIALLY PROTECTED.RESOR

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